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Governance, Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Welfare 
 
By 
Dibyendu Maiti and Arijit Mukherjee 
 
Abstract: 
The issue of economic governance is highly discussed pertaining to the question of 
industrialisation of a country, but the literature on trade and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) hardly pays attention to this aspect. We develop a simple model to show how 
better governance affects inward FDI and domestic welfare. We find that whether 
better governance in the domestic country attracts inward FDI depends on the way it 
affects the costs of the firms. The effect of better governance is ambiguous on 
domestic welfare and depends on the marginal cost difference between the firms, 
transportation cost and the extent of cost reduction through better governance. Our 
analysis reveals a strategic reason for poor governance in the presence of foreign 
competition.  
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Better economic governance for improving the investment climate is an important objective of 
many developing countries, and is getting significant attention in both academic and policy 
circles. The implications of economic governance are getting more attention in the economics 
literature, yet the literature on international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) did not pay 
much attention to this aspect. Due to the favourable effects of governance on the investment 
climate, a natural question is to ask the effects of better governance on inward FDI and the 
host country welfare, which concern many developing countries. We take up this issue in this 
paper.  
 
Using a simple model of international oligopoly with asymmetric costs, where a foreign firm can 
decide on export and FDI, we show the effects of better governance on inward FDI and the 
host country welfare. We show that whether better governance increases the incentive for 
inward FDI is ambiguous and depends on how better governance affects the marginal costs of 
production of the firms. Considering two components of the marginal costs of production – one, 
which is related to the labour productivity, and the other, which is independent of the labour 
productivity, we show that better governance increases the incentive for FDI if it reduces the 
component of the marginal costs that is not related to the labour productivity by a certain 
amount. However, if better governance increases labour productivity by a certain amount, thus 
reducing the marginal costs of the firms by the same proportion, it may reduce the incentive for 
FDI.  
 
We further show that, irrespective of the way better governance affects the marginal costs of 
the firms, the effects on the host country welfare are ambiguous, and depend on the factors 
such as the marginal cost difference between the firms, transportation cost and the extent of 
cost reduction through better governance. 
 1 
 
                                                
1. Introduction 
Better economic governance
1 for improving the investment climate is an important 
objective of many developing countries, and is getting significant attention in both 
academic and policy circles. As mentioned in the World Development Report (2005), 
“A good investment climate provides opportunities and incentives for firms – from 
microenterprises to multinationals – to invest productively, create jobs, and expand.” 
There are several factors such as policy uncertainty, macro instability, corruption, cost 
and access to finance, crime, regulation and tax administration, courts and legal 
system, electricity, labour regulations, transportation, access to land and 
telecommunications  affecting investment climates (World Development Report, 
2005), many (if not all) of which can be influenced by the quality of economic 
governance.  
The implications of economic governance are getting more attention in the 
economics literature (see, Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003, Dixit, 2007 and Rodrik, 2008), 
yet the literature on international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) did not pay 
much attention to this aspect. Due to the favourable effects of governance on the 
investment climate, a natural question is to ask the effects of better governance on 
inward FDI and the host country welfare, which concern many developing countries. 
We take up this issue in this paper. Although some efforts have been made to show 
the relationship between governance and FDI empirically, the theoretical literature did 
 
1 According to the World Bank, there are six indicators of governance - voice and accountability, 
political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and control of corruption. The World Bank report (2010) on Doing Business considers 10 indicators – 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, employing workers, registering property, getting 
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a 
business. The interpretation of governance by the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) broadens and suggests that: “Good governance requires three things: State capability – the 
extent to which leaders and governments are able to get things done. Responsiveness – whether public 
policies and institutions respond to the needs of citizens and uphold their rights. Accountability – the 
ability of citizens, civil society and the private sector to scrutinise public institutions and governments 
and hold them to account” (DFID, 2006).   2 
 
not pay much attention to this aspect. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper conducting a theoretical analysis on governance and inward FDI.   
  There are some evidences which support a positive relationship between 
governance and FDI (Sin and Leung, 2001, Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, Gani, 2007 
and Fan et al., 2007). However, the opposite view also prevails in the literature. 
Chang (2007) points out that the performances of some countries with weak 
governance are better than their counterparts with strong governance. Weller and 
Ulmer (2008) mention that “… China has attracted significant foreign investment 
despite notoriously persistent corruption”. Hence, the effects of governance on trade, 
investment and welfare may not be trivial, and it is due to the fact that real-world 
economies operate in a second-best environment because of multiple distortions of 
reform policies (Rodrik, 2008).  
In a different strand of literature, a number of studies are establishing the 
relationship between FDI and economic development (see, Reiter and Steensma, 2010 
and the references therein), both theoretically and empirically, but no unanimous 
result has been emerged. However, it has been found that a more selective approach 
towards FDI, which attracts FDI in certain sectors but in all sectors, has a more 
positive influence on human development compared to a situation where FDI comes 
to all sectors (Reiter and Steensma, 2010). Thus, it justifies the relevance of strategic 
and discriminatory policies towards FDI. 
  Using a simple model of international oligopoly with asymmetric costs, where 
a foreign firm can decide on export and FDI, we show the effects of better governance 
on inward FDI and the host country welfare. We show that whether better governance 
increases the incentive for inward FDI is ambiguous and depends on how better 
governance affects the marginal costs of production of the firms. Considering two 
components of the marginal costs of production – one, which is related to the labour 3 
 
                                                
productivity, and the other, which is independent of the labour productivity, we show 
that better governance increases the incentive for FDI if it reduces the component of 
the marginal costs that is not related to the labour productivity by a certain amount. In 
this situation, better governance reduces the marginal costs of the firms by the same 
amount. However, if better governance increases labour productivity by a certain 
amount, thus reducing the marginal costs of the firms by the same proportion, it may 
reduce the incentive for FDI.  
  We further show that, irrespective of the way better governance affects the 
marginal costs of the firms, the effects on the host country welfare are ambiguous, and 
depend on the factors such as the marginal cost difference between the firms, 
transportation cost and the extent of cost reduction through better governance.
2 
  In sum, if better governance reduces the marginal costs of the foreign firm and 
the host country firm in the similar ways, our analysis provides the following insights: 
(i)    In line with the usual perception, better governance can increase the host 
country welfare by attracting FDI. It is true if the marginal cost difference 
between the firms is sufficiently large compared to the international 
transportation cost. 
(ii)   If the marginal cost difference between the firms is sufficiently small 
compared to the international transportation cost, better governance may 
reduce the host country welfare by attracting FDI. This happens since the 
benefit of better governance may be taken away by the foreign firm. This 
provides a rationale for poor governance. Alternatively, it suggests that a 
government may need to complement better economic governance with other 
 
2 Mukherjee and Sinha (2007) show the effects of marginal cost reduction in the host country firm, 
either due to innovation or knowledge spill-over, on inward FDI and the host country welfare. Unlike 
that paper, better governance in the current paper reduces the marginal costs of both the host country 
firm and the foreign firm, and makes the type of cost reduction important. 4 
 
policies, such as tax policies, to extract rents from the foreign investors in 
order to increase both inward FDI and welfare.  
(iii)  If the marginal cost difference between the firms is sufficiently large 
compared to the international transportation cost, and the host country firm is 
sufficiently (marginal) cost inefficient than the foreign firm, better 
governance reduces the host country welfare, while FDI could increase the 
host country welfare compared to export by the foreign firm. This result 
provides another rationale for poor governance and may justify the Chinese 
situation. It suggests that poor governance may help to increase Chinese 
welfare by making the Chinese firms less efficient and the foreign firm more 
efficient, thus attracting FDI. 
(iv)    If the marginal cost difference between the firms is sufficiently small 
compared to the international transportation cost, but the host country firm 
has sufficiently (marginal) cost inefficient than the foreign firm, better 
governance may increase welfare by preventing FDI. This result suggests that 
a country with poor governance may attract more FDI by making the host 
country firms more inefficient, but that may not be good for their welfare. 
Alternatively, it suggests that a country may need complementary FDI 
policies along with better governance in order to maintain FDI flows and 
higher welfare.  
 
The above-mentioned implications (i) and (ii) hold irrespective of the way 
governance reduces the marginal costs of the firms, i.e., whether governance affects 
the component of the marginal costs that is related or unrelated to the labour 
productivity. However, the implications (iii) and (iv) can be found only if governance 
affects the component of the marginal cost that is related to the labour productivity. 5 
 
In an interesting work, Banerjee (1997) argues why government bureaucracies 
are often associated with red tape, corruption, and lack of incentives. He shows that 
the presence of asymmetric information may create the rationale for mis-governance 
by a benevolent government. In contrast, we provide a new reason for poor 
governance and show that the presence of foreign competition may create strategic 
reasons for underinvestment in economic governance. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the model 
and derives the results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there are two countries, called domestic country and foreign country. 
There is a firm in each country. Assume that firm 1 is in the foreign country and firm 
2 is in the domestic country. These firms compete in the domestic country with a 
homogeneous good. However, firm 1 can serve the domestic country either by export 
or by FDI. If firm 1 exports to the domestic country, it incurs a per-unit international 
transportation cost, z. But, if firm 1 undertakes FDI, it needs to set up its production 
plant in the domestic country, and therefore, needs to incur a fixed investment cost F.  
  We consider in the following analysis that governance does not affect the 
production activities but it affects non-production activities such as marketing and 
distribution. This is to ensure that better governance in the domestic country benefits 
both firms in a similar way, irrespective of the export and FDI decision of firm 1. It is 
trivial that if better governance improves the production activities, firm 1 will be 
benefitted more under FDI than under export, since firm 1 produces in the domestic 
country under FDI.  Hence, if better governance benefits firm 1 more under FDI than 
under export, it increases firm 1’s incentive for FDI more compared to a situation 
where better governance benefits firm 1 in the same way under export and FDI. To eliminate this bias, we consider that governance does not affect the production 
activities. However, it should be noted that our focus on non-production activities, 
such as, marketing and distribution, can be supported by the importance of these 
activities in affecting a firm’s decision on foreign market entry (Nocke and Yeaple, 
2007, Qiu, 2009 and Ishikawa, et al. 2010). 
  To economize the notations, we normalize the production costs of the firms to 
zero and assume that both firms need to incur positive non-production costs, such as, 
the costs of distribution and sales in the host country. Assume that, if there is a 
minimum (or no governance), to sell one unit of the output, firm 1 requires  1 λ  sales 
person, each of them working for h hours. Inverse of the working hours of the sales 
persons shows their productivities. A lower h implies that the productivity of a sales 
person has increased. Under minimum governance, firm 1 also incurs a domestic 
transaction (or trade) cost, t. Hence, if the competitive wage of a sales person is w, 
firm 1’s marginal cost is  11 0 hw t c t λ += +>. 
Under minimum or no governance, to sell one unit of the output, firm 2 
requires  2 λ  sales persons, each of them is working for h hours, where  21 λ λ > . Like 
firm 1, under minimum governance, firm 2 also incurs a domestic transaction or trade 
cost, t. Hence, given the competitive wage of a sales person as w, firm 2’s marginal 
cost is  22 0 hw t c t λ += +> . Our formulation shows that firm 1 has a better 
distribution technology. 
We will consider two situations in the following analysis: (i) where 
governance reduces the domestic trade cost, t, and (ii) where governance increases the 
productivities of the sales persons, i.e., reducing h. 
The first situation may be appropriate for the condition where governance 
improves the transportation service, say, by creating a better road and transaction 
6 
 facilities. The second situation may represent a case where better governance 
increases the productivities of the sales persons, say, by increasing political stability, 
thus reducing labour unrest, or by providing a better power service or a powerful 
internet service, which help the sales persons to operate their computing systems more 
efficiently, thus reducing the time required to finish each sales deal.
3  
  Two remarks deserve attention at this point. First, we treat the effects of better 
governance on domestic transaction cost and the productivities of the sales persons for 
understanding their effects clearly. Since the implications of the joint effects follow 




tion cost by , it reduce
marginal costs of firms 
Second, we have considered that better governance reduces the marginal costs 
of the firms, which may not be an unreasonable assumption. However, better 
governance may also reduce the investment cost
4 associated with FDI, i.e., F. If that 
is the case, better governance provides firm 1 more benefit under FDI than under 
export. Hence, as mentioned above, if better governance benefits firm 1 more under 
FDI than under export, it increases firm 1’s incentive for FDI more compared to a 
situation where better governance benefits firm 1 in the same way under FD
export.  
  Now consider the effects of better governance on the marginal costs of the 
firms. If better governance reduces the domestic transac s the 
1 and 2 respectively to   11 0 hw t e c t e
e
λ + −= +−≥  and 
22 0 hw t e c t e λ +−= +−≥ . Hence, in this situat on, i    the 
by e, i.e., reducing the hours of work by e, it reduces the marginal costs of firms 1 and 
                                                
better govern e reduces anc
m l costs of both firms by the same amount e.  
  However, if better governance increases the productivities of the sales persons 
argina
 
3  As mentioned in the World Development Report (2005) India’s problem in the power sector is 
legendary. 
4 World Development Report (2010) on Doing Business illustrates various such costs. 8 
 






= . In this situation, better governance reduces the marginal costs of both 






  We assume that the inverse demand function in the domestic country is: 
  P = a – q,             ( 1 )  
where P is price and q is the total output produced by both firms. 
  We consider the following game. Given the level of governance, which 
determines the firms’ marginal costs, at stage 1, firm 1 decides whether to undertake 
FDI or to export. At stage 2, the firms compete like Cournot duopolists, and the 
profits are realized. We solve the game through backward induction. 
 
2.1. If governance reduces domestic transaction cost 
We start with the case where better governance reduces domestic transaction cost, 
thus reducing the marginal costs by the same amount  .  e
  For a given level of governance, if firm 1 exports to the domestic country, 
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  Now consider the case where firm 1 undertakes FDI. In this situation, for a 
given level of governance, firms 1 and 2 maximize the following expressions 
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1 .    (5) 
The comparison of the profits of firm 1 under export and under FDI (see (3) 







ea c t z c
z
e ′ >− − − − + ≡        ( 6 )  
It shows that for a given fixed cost of FDI, better governance increases firm 1’s 
incentive for FDI. 
  The following result is immediate from (6).  
 
Proposition 1:  If better governance reduces domestic transaction cost by e, thus 
reducing the marginal costs of both firms 1 and 2 by the same amount e, it increases 
the possibility of undertaking FDI by firm 1. 
 
9 
   The reason for the above result is as follows. Better governance reduces the 
marginal cost of both firms by the same amount, thus increasing firm 1’s profit under 
both FDI and exporting. However, since the transportation cost creates a distortion in 
firm 1’s profit under export, firm 1’s gain from better governance is higher under FDI 
than under export. Hence, better governance increases firm 1’s incentive for FDI. 
Now consider the implications of better governance on domestic welfare, 
which is the sum of consumer surplus and profit of firm 2. If we have considered z as 
the tariff imposed by the domestic country, instead of an international transportation 
cost, Domestic welfare needs to consider the tariff revenue as well. The absence of 
tariff may be motivated by appealing to the empirical evidences. Milner (2005) shows 
that even if the tariff barriers have been reduced in recent years, international 
transportation costs are still significant and create sufficiently large trading costs. 
Similar conclusion can be found in Hummels (1991), according to whom international 
transport cost often represents a greater barrier to international trade than tariffs. The 
inclusion of a tariff barrier will not affect our qualitative results relating to firm 1’s 
decision on FDI and export, but it provides a higher domestic welfare under export by 
firm 1 than shown in our analysis. 
If firm 1 exports , domestic welfare is 
 
22
21 1 2 2( 2 ) (2 2 2 )
18
x act e cz ate c cz
W
−− + + ++− + − − −
= .  (7) 
However, if firm 1 undertakes FDI, domestic welfare is 
 
22
21 1 2( 2 ) (2 2 2 )
18
f act e c ate c c
W
−− + ++− + − −
=
2 .    (8) 
10 



























Insert Figures 1(a) and 1(b) 
  It follows from (6) that firm 1 undertakes FDI if  a ee ′ > . Hence, it follows 
from Figure 1(a) that the relevant welfare function is  x W  for   and  a ee ′ < f W  for 
. It is then immediate that better governance increases domestic welfare, 
irrespective of its effect on firm 1’s production strategy. 
a ee ′ >
  However, Figure 1(b) shows the possibility of a lower domestic welfare 
following better governance, if better governance induces firm 1 to undertake FDI. 
Since firm 1 undertakes FDI for  a ee ′ > , the relevant welfare function is  x W  for  a ee ′ <  
and  f W  for  a ee ′ >
a e
. However, if the level of governance increases from a level 
between   and  K ′ , say from    to a level between   k e a e ′  and  L, say to  , better 
governance reduces domestic welfare.   
l e
The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 2:  If better governance reduces domestic transportation cost, thus 
reducing the marginal costs of both firms by the same amount e, it  increases domestic 
welfare if  21 ()
2
z
cc −> , but it may reduce domestic welfare for  21 ()
2
z
cc −< by 
inducing FDI.  
 
                                                 
11 
 
5 For simplicity, we draw the welfare functions as straight lines.   The reason for the above result is as follows. Better governance reduces the 
costs of both firms and helps to increase domestic welfare, under both export and FDI 
by the foreign firm. However, since FDI allows the foreign firm to save the 
international transportation cost, for a given level of governance, on the one hand, 
FDI helps to increase the total outputs of the firms and therefore, the consumer 
surplus in the domestic country, but, on the other hand, it reduces the profits of the 
domestic firm. If the transportation cost is very small, the former effect dominates the 
later effect and creates higher domestic welfare under FDI than under export, for a 
given governance level. However, if the transportation cost increases, the latter effect 
gets stronger and for a sufficiently large international transportation cost, the latter 
effect dominates the former effect and creates higher domestic welfare under export 
by the foreign firm than under FDI by the foreign firm. 
  Propositions 1 and 2 prove the following points. If the marginal cost difference 
between the firms is relatively large compared to the international transportation cost, 
i.e.,  21 ()
2
z
cc −> , better governance attracts FDI and also increases domestic welfare. 
If the marginal cost difference between the firms is relatively small compared 
to the international transportation cost, i.e.,  21 ()
2
z
cc − < , better governance reduces 
domestic welfare by attracting FDI, unless the marginal cost reducing effects of 
governance are very strong. Thus, the welfare reducing effect of FDI may give a 
strategic reason for poor governance. Alternatively, it suggests that the domestic 
government may need to complement better economic governance along with other 
policies, such as hiking tax, to extract rents from the foreign investors in order to 
increase both inward FDI and domestic welfare following better governance.  
12 
   As a remark, it is important to note that our qualitative results of this section 
will not change even if we consider that better governance reduces the domestic 
transportation cost to te, instead of (t – e). 
 
2.2. If governance increases productivity of the sales person 
Now consider the situation where governance increases productivities of the sales 







  For a given governance level, if firm 1 exports, firms 1 and 2 maximize the 
following expressions respectively to determine their outputs: 
 
1
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  Now consider the case where firm 1 undertakes FDI. In this situation, firms 1 
and 2 maximize the following expressions respectively to determine their outputs: 
 
1
11 () p q
Max a q c g t q F −− − −                        (11a) 
 
2
22 () p q
Max a q c g t q −− − .                      (11b) 
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The comparison of the profits of firm 1 under export and under FDI (see (10) 




























,   for  21 2 cc < .                (13b) 
The following result follows immediately from (13a) and (13b). 
 
Proposition 3: If better governance increases productivities of the sales persons, thus 






better (poor) governance increases the possibility of FDI by firm 1 if  .  21 () 2 cc <>
 
  The reason for Proposition 3 is as follows. If better governance reduces the 
marginal costs of both firms by the same proportion, the absolute marginal cost 
reduction is higher in the domestic firm than in the foreign firm, since the former firm 
has a higher initial marginal cost. As a result, the effective benefit from governance is 
higher to the domestic firm than the foreign firm. If the marginal cost difference 
between the firms is very high, i.e.,  , the effective benefit from better  2 2 c > 1 c
14 
 governance is significantly higher to the domestic firm compared to the foreign firm. 




  If the initial marginal cost difference between the firms is not very large, i.e., 
, although better governance benefits the domestic firm more than the foreign 
firm, it increases the foreign firm’s incentive for FDI by reducing its marginal cost. 
2 2 c <
   Now consider the implications of better governance on domestic welfare. If 
firm 1 exports, domestic welfare is 
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If firm 1 undertakes FDI, domestic welfare is 
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. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) shows domestic welfare under export 










−>  respectively. 
Although we draw these figures separately to show the welfare implications clearly, 
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 depending on e. 
Insert Figures 2(a) and 2(b) 





−< , which implies that 
f x WW < . If we also have that   or  21 2 c > c 1 12 ccc < − , it implies that firm 1 
undertakes FDI for lower level of governance. Hence, in Figure 2(a), given the cost of 
FDI, firm 1 undertakes FDI for  p ee ′ <  if  12 1 cc c < − . Hence, the relevant welfare function is  f W  for   and  p ee ′ < x W  for  p ee ′ > . In this situation, better governance 
increases domestic welfare irrespective of the production strategies of the foreign firm. 





−<  but  21 2 cc <  or  . 
In this situation, 
21 ccc −< 1
f x WW <  but firm 1 undertakes FDI for e p e ′ > . Hence, the relevant 
welfare function is 
16 
 
x W p e ′ e f W  for  <  and   for  p ee ′ > . This situation is similar to 
Figure 1(b) and suggests that there are situations where better governance reduces 
domestic welfare. 




−> , which implies that 
f x WW > . 
In this situation, if better governance induces FDI, i.e.,  21 ccc 1 − < , the relevant 
welfare function is  p ee ′ < x W f W  for   and     for  p ee ′ > , and better governance 
increases domestic welfare, irrespective of the foreign firm’s production strategy. 
However, if  c , firm 1 undertakes FDI for e 12 1 cc − < p e ′ < . In this situation, the 
relevant welfare function is  p ee ′ < f W  for   and  x W  for  p ee ′ > . Hence, there are 
situations where better governance reduces domestic welfare. 
The above discussion gives the following result. 
 
Proposition 4: If better governance increases productivities of the sales persons, thus 





= , it 












Otherwise, better governance may reduce domestic welfare.  
   The reason for the above result is similar to the trade off mentioned in 
Proposition 2. The trade-off between a gain in consumer surplus and a loss of 
domestic  profit under FDI compared to export by firm 1 is the reason for this result. 
  Like subsection 2.1, Propositions 3 and 4 show that the usual perception, i.e., 
better governance attracts FDI and also increases domestic welfare, occurs if 






, which shows that the marginal cost difference between the 
firms is sufficiently large compared to the international transportation cost. 
Propositions 3 and 4 also show that better governance reduces domestic welfare by 
attracting FDI, unless the marginal cost reducing effects of governance are very strong. 






, which shows that the marginal cost 
difference between the firms is sufficiently small compared to the international 
transportation cost. Thus, the welfare reducing effect of FDI may give a strategic 
reason for poor governance. Alternatively, the domestic government may need to 
complement better economic governance with other policies, such as tax policies, to 
extract rents from the foreign investors in order to increase both inward FDI and 
domestic welfare following better governance.  
    Propositions 3 and 4 provide further implications, which are absent in 
subsection 2.1. 
Interestingly, we get another strategic reason for poor governance. If 
, which implies that better governance reduces the incentive for FDI, and  21 ccc −> 1




, which implies that FDI by the foreign firm provides higher 
domestic welfare compared to export by the foreign firm, better governance may 
prevent FDI by making the domestic  firms more efficient, while FDI could increase 
17 
 domestic welfare compared to export by the foreign firm. Thus, it may justify the 
Chinese situation. If the Chinese firms are sufficiently cost inefficient than the foreign 
firms, better governance in China, even if it makes the Chinese firms more efficient, 
can reduce Chinese welfare by reducing inward FDI. Therefore, poor governance may 
help Chinese economy by attracting more FDI. 
Finally, Propositions 3 and 4 show that better governance may increase 







result provides a caution. It suggests that a country with poor governance may attract 
more FDI by making the domestic firms more inefficient, but that may not be good 






, a country may need 
complementary FDI policies along with better governance in order to maintain FDI 
flows and higher welfare.  
 
3. Conclusion 
It is a general consensus that better economic governance encourages the firms – from 
microenterprises to multinationals – to invest by improving the investment climate. 
While the other branches of economics widely discuss the implications governance 
for the development of a country, the literature on international trade and FDI did not 
pay much attention to this aspect. 
We examine the implications of better governance in a domestic country, which 
reduces the costs of both the foreign and the domestic firms in the similar fashion, on 
the incentive for inward FDI and domestic welfare. We show that the effects on FDI 
depend on the way governance affects the marginal costs of the firms. Further, 




the factors such as the marginal cost difference between the firms, transportation cost 
and the extent of cost reduction through better governance. Thus, our analysis shows 
that the usual perception, i.e., better governance attracts FDI and also increases 
domestic welfare, is not immediate, and there are strategic reasons for poor economic 
governance. Alternatively, it suggests that better economic governance may need to 
be complemented with other policies in order to increase both inward FDI and 
domestic welfare. 
  It may be useful to discuss the implications of market structure on our results. 
We have considered a given market structure for our analysis. However, better 
governance may encourage some domestic firms to enter the market by reducing their 
marginal costs, thus increasing product-market competition in the domestic country. It 
is then immediate that, entry by domestic firms will reduce the foreign firm’s 
incentive for costly FDI, and this intuition follows from Mukherjee and Sinha (2007). 
Hence, if better governance encourages entry by domestic firms, it may reduce the 
foreign firm’s incentive for FDI even if better governance reduces the marginal costs 
of the firms by the same amount. Further, higher competition due to the entry of 
domestic firms increases the possibility of domestic welfare under better governance. 
Whether better governance affects the marginal costs by the same amount or 
by the same proportion is important for our results. It is worth pointing out that this 
type of effects will prevail in other aspects of the economic analysis with asymmetric 
cost firms. For example, whether the governments impose unit tax/subsidies, which 
affect the marginal costs by the same amount, or they impose ad-valorem 
tax/subsidies, which affect the marginal costs by the same proportion, may have 
significant implications for trade and industrial policies. Hence, the basic mechanism 
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